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Reservoirs and Reservations 
Karen M. Griffin 
In the late 1930s and 1940s. the Army Corps of Engineers was heavily involved in the development plans for a number 
of large dams located throughout the country. Many of these dams. and the reservoirs they created. have either been 
situated on Native American reservations or have had direct impact on reservations. This paper proposes that while 
the original intent of these dams was to benefit a number of people. there may have been those who saw dams as a 
convenient tool in the fight to terminate and assimilate the Native American population. Evidence regarding two of 
these projects. the Kinzua Dam on the Allegheny River and the Pick Sloan Project along the Missouri River evidence 
has been detected to support this hypothesis. In both cases the Native Americans were neither informed of the 
dramatic changes which would effect their lives. nor were they included in any of the discussions concerning these 
dams. All the tribes faced enormous opposition from the government. which resulted in costly and long-term legal 
battles an.d for some. the possible termination of their tribe. 
Many of the major dams found in the United States today 
were planned in the late 193's, 40s, and 50s by the Army 
Corps of Engineers. The 1940s and '50s is also known 
as the period of termination for many Native tribes. This 
paper propses that dams, and specifically the reservoirs 
they create, became a useful tool in the fight to terminate 
Native American tribes either through direct termination 
or by more subtle approaches in the destruction of their 
reservations and communities. 
While many would argue that dams were designed only 
to provide hydropower or control flooding problems, 
there can be little dispute that a large number have had 
direct and indirect effects on tribal lands and tribal 
people. There are some 17,537 reservoirs and 
impoundments alone on lands under BIA jurisdiction 
(Reddy 1993). These cover 507,139 surface acres of 
tribal lands (Reddy 1993:Table 1). Much of the land 
covered has been the prime land on the reservations. 
Homes, the best of the agricultural land, timberlands, 
sacred religious sites and numerous cemeteries have all 
been inundated by the waters of the reservoirs. Often the 
tribes were not even aware of the plans for the 
development of the dams until it was too late to stop the 
construction and the consequent devastation to their 
reservations. 
IMPACTS OF RESERVOIRS 
Dams and reservoirs have an enormous impact on the 
lands on which they are built. They substantially alter 
the courses of rivers, submerge large tracts of land, 
hamper or altogether destroy wildlife, trigger 
earthquakes, create breeding grounds for infectious 
diseases. and often inundate lands occupied by people. 
However, the effects on the land are not the only, nor the 
most damaging, effects. The social-cultural effects as ~ 
result of relocation and resettlement can be far more 
damaging and long-term. 
The most easily and widely used measures of impacts are 
usually in economic terms. Economists can easily 
measure the possible economic loss of agricultural lands 
or businesses within a given area. Yet. little 
consideration has been given to socio-cultural effects of 
relocation and resettlement. The forced relocation and 
resettlement of people has been shown to produce 
instability in the political structures of communities, the 
split up of kinship groups and in some cases of nuclear 
families, increased infant mortality rates, increased 
divorce rates, increased health problems. increased 
unemployment rates and a number of other problems. 
And invariably, these people who have been forced to 
relocate rarely receive any direct benefits such as the very 
electricity these dams produce (Colson 1971: Dr. Robert 
Hitchcock, personal communication, 1996). 
THE SENECAS OF THE ALLEGANY 
RESERVATION 
In 1794, George Washington signed a treaty with fifty-
nine sachems and war chiefs of the Iroquois Nations 
providing them with reservations in the New York and 
the Pennsylvania area. This treaty, signed by George 
Washington, and known as the Pickering Treaty stated: 
"Now the United States acknowledge all the land within 
the aforementioned boundaries, to be the property of the 
Seneka nation: and the United States will never claim the 
same, nor disturb the Seneka nation ... but it shall remain 
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theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of 
the United States. who have the right to purchase." 
Even before this treaty, in 1791, Cornplanter, the great 
Seneca war chief, had granted to him and his heirs "in 
perpetuity" three tracts of land by the state of 
Pennsylvania for his service in protecting American 
settlers and keeping the peace between the Senecas and 
the Americans (Josephy 1968). Two of these tracts 
Cornplanter later sold, but he retained a 908 acre tract 
for himself and his descendants. When he died in 1836. 
Cornplanter was buried on this tract of land along the 
Allegheny River, and in 1866 the state of Pennsylvania 
erected a stone monument over his grave. 
But this tract of land had even further significance for the 
Seneca for it was on this land that Handsome Lake, 
Cornplanter's half-brother, had his first revelation. 
Handsome Lake was considered a prophet by the Iroquois 
people and his new religion was quickly adopted by many 
of the Iroquois. It is still practiced and evident in 
Iroquois life today. The Iroquois consider this land to be 
sacred ground with deep religious significance. 
The Senecas have lived on their reservation land since 
the 1794 treaty with only occasional interferences by the 
US government for things such as mandatory public 
education for children. But in the 1950s, things were to 
change drastically for the Senecas along the Allegheny 
River. In 1957, the US Army Corps of Engineers began 
to act on a 1938 plan to construct a dam to control the 
flood waterS of the Allegheny River and to provide the 
city of Pittsburgh with additional electrical power. The 
project was known as the Kinzua Dam (Josephy 1968). 
The Kinzua Dam, 179 feet high and almost 1,900 feet 
long, would eventually cost $120 million to construct 
and created a reservoir 35 miles long (Josephy 1968; 
Abrams 1976; New Republic 1964). This reservoir 
inundated over 10,000 acres of the 30,469 Allegheny 
Reservation, including Cornplanter's tract where his 
grave and monument resided, and forced the relocation 
of 700 Seneca people (Abrams 1976; Christian Century 
1964). And while approximately 20,469 acres may seem 
to be a substantial portion of land, this was not the case. 
The leased town of Salamanca, New York, roads and 
railroads and other small towns occupied by whites on 
the reservation occupied nearly 12,000 acres. The 
remaining land was rocky, steep, forested hillside which 
was unsuitable for building homes. 
The land flooded by the reservoir was the most fertile 
land of the reservation and also the best hunting grounds 
for the Senecas, a crucial factor for a people who still 
partially lived on subsistence hunting (The Economist 
1962). It also provided the Senecas wood for fuel and 
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clear, cold water wells and springs. With relocation due 
to the dam, the Senecas would be forced to pay for fuel 
and municipally supplied, chlorinated drinking water 
(Senior Scholastic 1964). 
But this land was more than just a place to live and hunt. 
It had greater meaning and significance for the Seneca 
people, including its sacred status in relation to the 
prophet Handsome Lake. Anthropologists Stanley 
Diamond, William Sturtevant and William Fenton stated 
in a memorandum submitted to the Subcommittees on 
Indian Affairs in 1964 on the Seneca reservation: 
No matter how crude living and other facilities may be in fact, 
the reservation itself is a home and a shelter, and the most 
tangible symbol of Indianess, both for those now living there 
and for many tribe members temporarily living elsewhere. In 
this, Indians differ from other citizens, including other minority 
groups, for whom the specific land they occupy is of far less 
cultural and psychological significance. The reservation is, 
however, not merely a repository of a dwindling heritage. It is, 
also, a society in which new possibilities of Indian cultural 
expression struggle to establish themselves. (Diamond et al. 
1964:632). 
The area to be inundated by the reservoir was not only 
occupied by the homes of the Seneca people, it also was 
where their ancestors were buried. Some 3,000 graves 
would have to be relocated, among them the grave of 
Cornplanter (Josephy 1968). 
All of this would have been difficult enough for the 
Seneca people to endure, but to make matters worse the 
manner in which the Seneca people were treated 
throughout the planning and construction of the dam 
added insult to injury. When the Army Corps of 
Engineers requested authorization for the building of 
Kinzua Dam in 1938 and again in 1941, they had not 
bothered to either inform the Seneca people nor consult 
with them. In fact, the Army Co~ of Engineers did not 
even bother to mention that the dam would break one of 
the oldest US treaties in existence when they gave their 
presentation to Congress (Josephy 1968). 
The Senecas were further deceived in 1955 when 
engineers arrived on the reservation supposedly to 
conduct surveys, telling the Senecas that they were not 
even sure that this was where they wanted to locate the 
dam (Josephy 1968). In 1956, Congress appropriated the 
funds necessary to construct the Kinzua Dam. The 
Senecas learned afterwards that hearings were conducted 
in which the engineers testified; Senecas were neither 
invited nor informed (Josephy 1968). 
In reaction to the appropriation of funds, the Senecas 
sought an injunction to halt the construction of the dam. 
They also hired two outside engineers to review the 
Kinzua Dam and to see if there was an alternative to the 
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location. Dr. Arthur E. Morgan, the former chairman of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority and former president of 
Antioch College and Barton M. Jones, the builder of the 
TVA's Norris Dam were hired by the Seneca tribe. Dr. 
Morgan made it clear to the Senecas that "should he find 
that Kinzua was essential to the protection of a great city 
like Pittsburgh, he would advise them not to object-and 
they agreed" (Taylor 1 % 1). 
Dr. Morgan and Mr. Jones found that there was in fact 
an alternative solution to the construction of the Kinzua 
Dam. In a letter to President Kennedy dated March 16, 
1%1, Dr. Morgan wrote: 
In fixing on the Kinzua Dam site more than thirty years ago, the 
C01l>s of Engineers made a colossal blunder or oversight in 
failing to discover the Conewango-Cattaraugus site, with 
diversion of excess flood waters into Lake Erie. As compared 
with Kinzua, choice of the Conewango-Cattaraugus location 
would save the Seneca Indian reservation, would protect 
Pittsburgh from twice as great a flood as would Kinzua, and 
would entirely remove Upper Allegheny flood water from the 
Ohio, thus saving the need for spending probably more than 
$100,000,000 for additional reservoirs; and especially, 
Conewango Reservoir with its vast capacity would make 
possible the storage of three times as much water as would 
Kinzua for increasing low water flow in the Ohio River-and 
all this at less cost than Kinzua (Taylor 1961: 121). 
Dr. Morgan's alternative plan, even when shown to be 
more beneficial, was not accepted by President Kennedy 
or Congress. The Corps of Engineers claimed it would 
be more expensive and that it could not provide the 
recreational opportunities that the Kinzua Dam could. 
The Corps had strong political support from members of 
Congress and strong allies of President Kennedy; as a 
result, the Senecas lost (Josephy 1 %8). 
But the Seneca's plight did not end there. The 
encroaching waters of the reservoir began to rise and 
were close to flooding the homes of the people, although 
they had not yet received any funding from the federal 
government which would allow them to relocate. 
However, the railroad, which also faced some relocation 
of tracks, received $20 million without delay (Christian 
Century 1964). 
According to House Resolution 1794. the Senecas were to 
receive $16 million for the damage and relocation forced 
on them by the construction of the Kinzua Dam. The 
resolution passed the House of Representatives but stalled 
in the Senate. The Committee of the Interior slashed the 
budget to $9.123,000, even though there was adequate 
proof justifying the amount of $16 million. A rider 
attached to the resolution required the Senecas to submit 
within two years a plan for termination of their special 
relationship to the federal government (Christian Century 
Reservoirs and Reservations 
1964). The Senecas believed that the termination rider 
was linked with the compensation bill to force them to 
terminate (Christian Century 1964). If they refused the 
resolution altogether, they would lose not only their 
homes but the means to acquire new homes. 
The Senecas eventually received $5,466,615.04 with 
$546,661.50 going to legal fees (Abrams 1976). In 1965, 
they went to court again to halt the construction of a 
four-lane highway through the remainder of their 
reservation land. Once again, they lost. and their land 
was further reduced. 
THE PICK-SLOAN PROJECT 
The most detrimental dam project to Native Americans 
in the United States is undoubtedly the Pick-Sloan 
Project. Situated on the Missouri River, the Pick-Sloan 
project consists of a number of large dams located 
primarily in the Northern Plains. The purpose of the 
Pick-Sloan project was to control flooding, produce 
hydropower, and increase navigation trade. But this 
project came at a great cost to the many reservations 
which bordered the Missouri River. 
In total, twenty-three different reservations were affected 
by the Pick-Sloan project (Lawson 1982). Three of the 
dams alone flooded 202,000 acres of Lakota land 
(DeLoria 1994) (see Table 2). All of the reservations 
combined lost a total of 353,313 acres for reservoir 
storage (Department of the Interior 1954) and a total of 
and more than 900 Native American families had to be 
relocated (Lawson 1982). The heaviest damage to a 
single reservation was inflicted upon the Three Affiliated 
Tribes (Mandan, Arikara and Hidatsa) of North Dakota. 
Their entire reservation life was disrupted by the 
Garrison Dam and the huge reservoir that would form 
behind it. 
The Fort Berthold Reservation, home to the Three 
Affiliated Tribes, was the first to deal with the Pick-
Sloan project. The people of this reservation lived 
predominantly on the bottomland along the Missouri 
and, as a result, they suffered the greatest devastation to 
their community and way of life. The Three Tribes were 
successful ranchers and farmers whose means of income 
depended on the lands on which they lived. They lost 
94% of their most productive land-in total, 152,360 
acres-and over one-fourth of their total land base 
(Lawson 1982). These lands were submerged beneath 
the waters of the reservoir created by the 212-foot-high 
Garrison Dam. However, without Congress' approval. 
the Corps modified the construction of the dam, reducing 
the height to avoid flooding the predominantly White 
town of Williston. North Dakota. 
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Some 349 families, approximately 80 percent of the tribal 
population as well as the agency center, had to be 
relocated (Lawson 1982). The community life for these 
people, who relied heavily on kinship groups and other 
primary groups was destroyed. Some people moved to 
urban areas where they lived a life of despair. Among 
these previously successful ranchers and farmers, 
unemployment rose to 79 percent (Lawson 1982). 
Like the Seneca tribe, many of the Native nations along 
the Missouri were unaware of the plans that were to 
affect them until it was too late. The Missouri Basin 
States Committee (MBSC), a group composed of 
representatives from the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of 
Engineers, business people in the Upper Basin, and 
government representatives from the states of South 
Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Nebraska 
and later Kansas, Missouri and Iowa formed a permanent 
coalition to push for a water development program for 
the Missouri River (Schneiders 1996). This group 
supposedly was to represent a broader political and 
economic perspective on the project, and yet not one 
Native American was invited to become a member to 
represent the interests of the Native Americans, the 
group of people who would be most drastically affected 
by the proposed project. Even when the MBSC held 
public forums in cities all along the Missouri to inform 
the people of the proposed project, not one forum was 
ever held on any of the reservations for the sake of the 
Native Americans (Schneiders 1996). 
The Three Affiliated Tribes tried to negotiate with the 
Corps of Engineers and the government to compensate 
them for the great loss they were to suffer. They 
originally requested an equivalent amount of 
compensatory land, 20,000 kilowatt-hours per year of 
electricity, permission to graze and water their cattle 
along the margins of the reservoir, and first rights to the 
timber which the reservoir would flood (Reisner 1986). 
In the end, what they received added insult to injury. 
The tribe received only $5,105,625 for their lost lands 
which calculated out to a mere $33 per acre. 
Furthermore, they could not water their cattle along the 
reservoir nor fish, hunt or use the reservoir for any other 
purposes, they were forbidden to use any of their funds to 
hire attorneys to fight for further compensation, they 
would not be given any free electricity and they could not 
even harvest the timber that was. flooded by the reservoir 
(Lawson 1982; Reisner 1986). They were able to seek 
further compensation through Congress, where they were 
eventually awarded another $7.5 million; this brought the 
entire settlement to $12,605,625, well below the $22 
million the Three Affiliated Tribes felt was a fair market 
price (Lawson 1982). 
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The next reservation to succumb to the Pick-Sloan 
project was the Yankton Reservation. The Corps of 
Engineers apparently was aware of the lack of 
organization on this reservation and quickly set out to 
condemn thirty-one tracts of land on the reservation. A • 
move that was illegal and which violated the Yankton 
Treaty of 1858 and also disregarded legal precedents 
established by the Supreme Court (Lawson 1982). Not 
only did the Corps illegally confiscate the land, but upon 
deposit of $132,324 in the federal district court, the . 
Corps took immediate possession of the land and charged 
rent to the 19 families still living on it (Lawson 1982). 
The Yankton Lakota, unaware of their rights, did not 
challenge the action and the district court magistrates 
apparently did not do thorough research regarding other 
legal decisions. It would take six years ~fore the 
yankton people would receive any additional 
compensation for their forced resettlement. 
By the time the Oahe Dam was scheduled to begin 
construction, William Zimmerman, Jr., Acting 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, took action to provide 
the Native people with more humane treatment in 
regards to their resettlement process. Senator Chan 
Gurney and Congressman Francis Case of South Dakota 
introduced legislation which would establish legal 
guidelines in the facilitation process and which would 
require the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Army Corps 
of Engineers to work together to reach a settlement 
similar to that of the Fort Berthold agreement (Lawson 
1982). In September of 1950 the bill was passed 
requiring both the Corps and the secretary of the interior 
to work with representatives from the various tribes. The 
bill also required that settlement not only cover the cost 
of land but allow for improvements and relocation of the 
people "so that their economic, social, religious, and 
community life can be reestablished and protected" (Act 
of 30 September 1950). 
While this act was a step in the right direction. it did 
ignore some serious concerns. It did not set aside any 
electric power for the exclusive use of the tribes. 
requiring the native people to purchase electricity at the 
same rate as rural cooperatives and public bodies. 
Congressman Case pointed out that this cost would be so 
detrimental to the tribes that it would negate any 
compensation they may receive. The law also did not 
provide any legal compensation for the tribes nor did it 
resolve the question of shoreline access rights (Lawson 
1982). 
The Cheyenne River, Standing Rock Lakota, Lower 
Brule and Crow Creek tribes were determined to receive 
better settlements than the Fort Berthold tribes and the 
yankton Lakota. This battle would take much longer 
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and was much harder than they had anticipated. The 
tribes attempted to hire outside. attorneys to assist them in 
their battle for fair negotiation settlements. Even this 
proved to be a difficult task. The Standing Rock tribe 
sought to hire an attorney using their own tribal funds. 
The tribe wanted to hire an attorney who could represent 
them throughout the negotiations no matter how long 
they took. They sought the services of James E. Curry, a 
Washington attorney who was known to be extremely 
critical of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. But Indian 
Commissioner Dillion S. Myer, a bitter enemy of Curry 
and former administrator of the Japanese internment-
camp program, refused to approve this action and instead 
would only allow a one-year contract. Myer also refused 
Curry's contract with the Crow Creek Lakota as well as 
12 other tribes (Lawson 1982). For his actions on this 
matter, Myer received strong support from many people 
in Washington, including members of the Senate Indian 
Affairs Subcommittee. The Standing Rock tribe made a 
formal protest to Interior Secretary Oscar Chapman who 
dragged his feet for some time before making any 
decisions. It was not until a contingent of the tribes 
camped for 26 days outside of Chapman's office that he 
finally rendered a decision. He sided with the Lakota 
and approved an important decision for all Native people 
in the US: that they could hire their own attorneys and 
make their own contracts with the attorneys. 
But Myer retaliated by controlling the purse strings of the 
B.1.A. He would only allow the Standing Rock tribe to 
use $300 per year for legal fees, thereby almost 
destroying any means for competent legal representation 
for the tribes. Furthermore, Myer blocked other attempts 
by the tribe to hire outside attorneys. In the end, the tribe 
felt compelled to hire an attorney which Myer approved. 
They had to settle for M.Q. Sharpe, former governor of 
South Dakota and a strong supporter of the Pick Plan in 
the 1944 congressional debate (Lawson 1982). 
Obtaining fair settlement terms from the Army Corps of 
Engineers was nearly impossible for the tribes, and most 
of the tribes eventually took their cases to the courts to be 
settled. The Cheyenne River tribe eventually received 
$10,644,014 for their lost land and forced relocation 
however. this was $13 million less than originally 
requested. And while they did retain all salvage, mineral 
and shoreline rights, they did not receive a block of 
hydroelectric power nor exclusive shoreline recreation 
facilities rights. Furthermore, Congress denied the 
federal trust status to lands purchased outside the 
reservation as substitution for the inundated lands and 
final authority for disbursement of funds was given to the 
Secretary of the Interior, not the tribal council (Lawson 
1982). 
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The yankton Lakota received $106,500 in addition to the 
$132,324 paid by the Army Corps of Engineers. The 
yankton tribe received the same shoreline rights as the 
Cheyenne River tribe but the mineral rights were reduced 
to gas and oil only. Furthermore, the Yankton Lakota 
were unable to secure rehabilitation funds which would 
have helped them improve the social and economic 
situation for the entire tribe. 
The Crow Creek, and Lower Brule faired somewhat 
better than the yankton tribe. The Crow Creek tribe 
settled for $4,366,802 and the Lower Brule settled for 
$3,194,465 with additional rights similar to those 
granted to the Cheyenne River tribe (Lawson 1982). 
Even though the Standing Rock tribe sustained less 
damage than the Cheyenne River tribe or the Fort 
Berthold tribe, they faired much better in terms of 
settlement. In the end they eventually received 
$12,346,553 in funds along with some additional 
benefits. Their settlements funds were exempted from 
taxation and these funds were also exempt from any 
previous debts or loans except those owed the federal 
government or tribal government (Lawson 1982). Any 
land not needed for the Oahe Dam project was to be 
returned to the Standing Rock Lakota (although no lands 
were returned); oil and gas were specifically included in 
the mineral rights, and the tribe was given 60 days to 
salvage property (Lawson 1982). They also faired better 
in terms of their negotiating compensation. The 
Standing Rock tribe received $135,000 compared to the 
Cheyenne River's $100,000. Also, the Standing Rock 
tribe were not restricted in how these funds could be 
used. The Cheyenne River tribe could not use more than 
50010 for legal accumulated legal fees. 
In the end, the losses suffered by the tribes far 
outweighed any monetary gains they may have made in 
the courts. The Fort Berthold tribes were severely 
traumatized and never fully recovered from the loss of 
their lands. The lives of all of the affected tribes were 
greatly affected. Not having access to the rich 
bottomlands was detrimental to the very life of these 
people. These areas provided them with free fuel and 
timber for use in their homes. Loss of these wooded 
areas forced into a cash economy rather than a 
subsistence economy, further sapping their low incomes. 
The bottomlands were also rich in wild plant life, 
essential to the diets of these people. The gathering of 
these fruits and vegetables is a practice which extends 
well back into their history and which is a tradition in 
their culture. The wild herbs and plants were used not 
only for food, but for religious purposes as well. Loss of 
these plants severely disrupted their religious practices 
and ceremonies (Lawson 1982: Reisner 1986). 
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The bottomlands also provided shelter during the hot 
blazing sun of summer and protection from freezing 
blizzards in the winter. Homes built on higher ground 
required greater insulation due to the exposure of the 
open plains; the people were no longer able to heat by 
wood stoves. but were forced to seek other, more costly 
fuels. 
The wooded areas were abundant with wildlife which not 
only supplemented the diets of the Native people, but 
provided a source of income. The Pick-Sloan project 
reduced the wildlife population by 75 percent, severely 
restricting the available food source and income. 
(Lawson 1982). 
Ranching had become the primary means of income on 
nearly all of the reservations. The inundation of the 
prime rangeland had severe affects on Native ranchers. 
Some ranchers were forced to liquidate and others had to 
substantially reduce the size of their herds because of the 
poor grazing lands, loss of natural shelter, lack of freely 
available water and the requirement of fences to protect 
the herds from the fluctuating waters of the reservoir. 
People who had become self-sufficient and conformed to 
a more sedentary life had the very fabric of their lives 
ripped away again by the building of these massive dams. 
CONCLUSION 
In order to receive any form of compensation for the loss 
of their homes and their lands, the Seneca tribe were 
forced to submit a plan for their termination requested in 
the rider attached to House Resolution 1794. For the 
tribes along the Missouri, a more indirect approach was 
taken in the form of destruction of their communities. 
This forced many people to leave the reservation 
altogether and, in many cases, destroyed their means of 
subsistence. While the reservations along the Missouri 
did not have a direct request for termination, the 
devastation to their reservations amounted to the demise 
of their culture. One wonders whether some politicians 
and others found the dams a convenient means of further 
destroying the Native American culture. 
More recently, there have been some gains made by 
tribes to protect their reservations and the destruction of 
their culture. The Yavapai of Arizona were successful in 
stopping the building of the Orme Dam in its original 
location, thereby saving their reservation and blocking 
their forced removal. Native American groups in the 
Northwest have formed an organization to protect their 
fishing rights along the Columbia River, and the tribes 
along the Missouri have formed the Mni Sose Intertribal 
Water Rights Coalition, an organization to protect 
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themselves from losing further lands and to protecting 
their water rights. Native Americans need to stay 
informed and to organize to protect themselves from 
further encroachment on their lands by dams and 
reservoirs, and to protect their water rights granted to 
them in the numerous treaties made with the US 
Government. 
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TABLE 1. Surface Water on Lands Under BfA Jurisdiction 
SURFACE SHORE 
TYPE OF WATER. NUMBER ACRES MILES LINE MILES 
Natural lakes and ponds 5,690 1,001,825 
-
5,845 
Reservoirs & impoundments 
17,537 507,139 
-
4,573 
Perennial streams 4,047 384 14,279 6,500 
Coastal 349 - 39 330 
TOTAL 27,623 1,509,348 14,318 17,248 
Source: Bureau of Indzan Affairs Natural Resource InformatIOn System Inventory and ProductIOn Report, J 989, 
United States Department of the Interior, Report No. 55-38-X, p. 3. A dash (-) indicates no data given in original 
source. 
TABLE 2. Impact of The Pick-Sloan Project on Reservation Lands 
Amount of Number of Percentage Type of land 
Acres Lost Families of Population Lost 
Relocated 
Ft. Randall 22,091 136 
Dam 
Lower Brule 7,997 35 16% 1/2 sheltered 
pastureland 
Yankton 3,349 19 8% 
Crow Creek 9,514 84 34% bottomland, 
1/3 timber 
Oalte Dam 160,889 
Standing Rock 55,994 170 25% rangeland, 
agricultural, 
timber, wild 
fruit, wild-
life 
Cheyenne River 104,420 180 30% sla above 
Bi2 Bend 
Lower Brule 14,609 62 53% timber, pasture-
land, farms~ 
ranches 
Crow Creek 6,417 27 11% farms, ranches 
Garrison Dam 
Ft. Berthold 152,360 349 80% agricultural, 
grazing land, 
timber 
Source: M. L. Lawson, Dammed Indians, 1982. Umversity of Oklahoma Press. 
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